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THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLffiCAL SE· 
DUCI'ION OF THE LAW. By Robert H. Bork.1 New York: 
The Free Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 432. $22.50. 
THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
THE BORK NOMINATION. By Michael Pertschuk2 and 
Wendy Schaetza}.3 New York: Thunder's Mouth Press. 
1989. Pp. xi, 317. $24.95 (cloth); $13.95 (paper). 
BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINA· 
TION SHOOK AMERICA. By Ethan Bronner.4 New 
York: W.W. Norton. 1989. Pp. 339. $22.50. 
John P. Roches 
There was an air of unreality about the whole Bork affair 
which these three books do little to dissipate. Indeed, the more a 
clinical observer of the American political scene reviews this battle, 
the more mysterious certain dimensions appear. Perhaps I should 
at the outset set out the premises of my analysis to avoid accusation 
of cherishing a secret agenda. (Regrettably this may require repeti-
tion of points made here and elsewhere on earlier occasions, but 
then old whales live off their own oil.) For starters, I take it for 
granted that the Supreme Court is now and has since its creation 
been a political institution. Given the overlapping jurisdictions of 
the congress, the president and the judiciary under our system, the 
political matters that are dumped on the Court's doorstep are usu-
ally booby-traps. Congresses and presidents who are exposed to the 
chilly winds of public controversy without life tenure love to pass 
the buck to our Platonic Guardians. Has anyone heard a governor 
or state legislator applauding the Court's Webster decision, which 
returned part of the abortion buck to these politicians? 
Just as in 1787 the Founding Fathers left certain ambiguities 
(e.g., the structure of the federal judiciary, the definition of national 
citizenship) to be clarified by the new government, the politicians of 
later generations have hoped the Court would rescue them from 
messy confrontations, or provide succor. The classic instance of the 
I. John M. Olin Scholar in Legal Studies, the American Enterprise Institute. 
2. Co-Director, The Advocacy Institute, Washington, D.C. 
3. A "media strategist" for the Advocacy Institute. 
4. Supreme Court writer for the Boston Globe. 
5. John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of American Civilization and Foreign Af-
fairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 
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first sort was the almost universal 1850s political conspiracy to get 
the Supreme Court to "settle" the slavery question. Charles Evans 
Hughes overstated the matter a bit when he called Dred Scott a 
"self-inflicted wound;" Congress had been busy enacting what sar-
donic Senator Tom Corwin of Ohio called "not a law, but a law-
suit" to force the slavery question onto the Court's agenda. Taney's 
folly was that, unlike his colleague Justice Nelson who had burked 
the case procedurally on circuit, he thought he could play the Mes-
siah, and found seven competitors on the bench. 6 
Political losers got little help from the Supreme Court before 
the development of the concept of substantive due process. When 
President Jefferson-in an "unpacking" of the judiciary that made 
FDR's "court-packing" proposal look like a tea-party at the vicar-
age-pushed the Judiciary Act of 1802 through a delighted Repub-
lican Congress, he defenestrated sixteen federal circuit judges by 
simply abolishing their positions. They had been named by Presi-
dent John Adams under the authority of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 
and approved by the Senate. In short, they were what we today 
would call "Article III judges," supposedly seated for life, but now 
on the street. The newly unemployed Virginia circuit judge hoped 
that Chief Justice John Marshall might take a dim view of Jeffer-
son's exertions, but that canny veteran of Virginia's wars refused 
the bait. Instead, picking his own (preposterous yet effective) bat-
tlefield, Marshall used Marbury as the vehicle for expressing his 
acidulous views on his cousin's constitutional innovations. 1 
The relevance of all this to the Bork affair is patent: I think it 
is legitimate to oppose a judicial appointee on "political" grounds 
and I have done so on several occasions beginning with Burton, 
Vinson, Clark, and Minton, Truman's underwhelming choices. 
Anyone who thinks this "un-American" is referred to John Ad-
ams's 1795 letter to Abigail on the splendid conduct of the Senate in 
rejecting John Rutledge as Chief Justice for his opposition to the 
Jay Treaty, or to Jefferson's comments on the same event to Wil-
6. For the background in superb summary, see Nevins, The Constitution. Slavery and 
the Territories, in THE GASPER G. BACON LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1953). 
7. For elaboration of my position on such matters, see Roche, Education. Segregation 
and the Supreme Court: A Political Analysis, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 949 {1951); Roche, Executive 
Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative, 5 WESTERN PoL. Q. 592 (1952); 
Roche, Plessy v. Ferguson: Requiescat in Pace?, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 44 (1954); Roche, Judi-
cio/ Self-Restraint, 49 APSR 762 (1955); Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Coucus in 
Action, 55 APSR 799 (1962); Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 103 (1963); Roche, The Expatriation Decisions: A Study in Constitutional Improvisation 
and the Uses of History, 58 APSR 72 (1964); Roche, Equality in America: The Expansion of a 
Concept, 43 N.C.L. REv. 249 (1965). 
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liam Giles.s American constitutional law has always been a con-
tact-sport. 
It does not follow that one should oppose every nominee whose 
political views are imperfect. Tactically, the question is whether 
you believe you can force the president to give you a candidate you 
like better. To take a good example, after the Carswell nomination 
had gone down in flames, Nixon had to dive toward the middle and 
emerged with Chief Justice Burger's old friend Harry Blackmun. 
Surely none of Carswell's liberal opponents has had cause to regret 
his opposition to the man that Senator Hruska tried to defend on 
the ground that mediocrities are entitled to representation on the 
Court. On the other hand, the defeat of Judge John J. Parker in 
1930 surely led to a net loss for the Court: Owen J. Roberts's only 
redeeming judicial value was as Hughes's pocket-vote in the "switch 
in time that saved nine." 
Which brings us to the macropolitical setting in which the 
Bork saga was played out. The Republicans lost control of the Sen-
ate in the 1986 elections, a fact that was taken by the media as in-
dicative of liberal Democratic resurrection. But one who looked 
closely at the individual Senate races where Democrats gained seats 
would have found few traces of ideological polarization. In the 
South the Democrats rallied unprecedented black support, but the 
Democratic contenders were facing incumbents who had-in sev-
eral cases much to their own surprise- been carried in by Reagan's 
1980 coattails. They were not an impressive lot: an eminent south-
em Senator of my acquaintance observed that "they were such tur-
keys that even the other turkeys noticed." At any rate, enough new 
Democrats entered the Senate to provide a net Senate majority of 
ten. These newcomers discovered that they were supposed to be 
"liberal" paladins, devotees of the "Massachusetts Miracle," gay 
rights, higher taxes, lower defense budgets, saving whales, and abor-
tion. It was rumored that the Kennedy Institute at Harvard was 
offering a crash seminar on "How to be a Liberal." 
The Bork nomination gave them the perfect opportunity to be 
"Liberal" on the cheap. The nomination had been anticipated by 
liberal pressure groups, and occurred against a background of leaks 
from the White House and Justice Department to the effect that 
now, at last, the conservatives were going to dominate the Court 
and-presumably by a great demonstration of judicial self-re-
straint-whack away at famous liberal precedents. It was a goofy 
spectacle, but then nobody ever accused President Reagan or Attor-
8. See Roche, Book Review, The Documentary History of the Supreme Coun of the 
United States, 1789-1800, VoL I. Pans 1 and 2, 4 CoNST. CoMM. 166, 171 (1987). 
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ney General Meese of being cunning; indeed, had my rational 
faculty not overpowered my conspiratorial instincts I would have 
accused Meese of being a covert fund-raiser for the ACLU9 and 
People for the American Way. 
So the cannon roared, the smoke cleared, and there stood Rob-
ert Bork, destined to be the great Tribune of "original intent," old-
fashioned virtue, and vintage Americanism. I doubt that he fully 
realized, when he was sent forth as the Defender of the Faith, that 
his sponsors had put him in such an exposed position. The poor 
man never knew what hit him: during his inquisition I was con-
stantly reminded of the Charlie Chaplin movie in which the tramp 
sees a red warning flag fall off a projection from a truck, grabs it and 
runs after the driver shouting, then accidentally finds himself lead-
ing a communist parade that swings behind him at the next corner, 
and finally gets clobbered by the cops. 
Pertschuk and Schaetzal have given us a thunderous ex parte 
exploration of the hatchet job that was done on Bork both in and 
outside of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. I will examine 
later what I consider to be the odious nature of the attack; suffice it 
here to say that it was extraordinarily effective in bashing Bork and 
sub specie aeternitatis totally useless: a thoughtful, perceptive, and 
speculative conservative was dumped; a colorless but equally con-
servative Justice Kennedy now sits in his place. When I finished 
reading The People Rising, momentarily hypnotized, I had visions 
of Justice Laurence Tribe, or Justice Alan Dershowitz, enrobed vice 
Robert Bork, but regaining my senses I recalled instead some 
friends of mine in World War II who, after a fierce firefight, cap-
tured the wrong Pacific atoll. 
In strategic terms, then, the campaign against Bork was a fail-
ure, but beyond that-if one knows anything about the folkways of 
the Senate-it was a farce. Recall that in 1986 the Republican 
dominated Senate approved Antonin Scalia by a vote of ninety-eight 
to zero, and in my judgment Justice Scalia is a far more rock-ribbed 
conservative than the intellectually curious and ruminative Bork. 
(In fact, Scalia, as some of his opinions and side-shots in oral argu-
ments suggest, may age into the churlish James McReynolds of the 
Rehnquist Court.) Moreover, if the president had nominated Sena-
tor Orrin Hatch of the Judiciary Committee, surely a vintage con-
9. "Partly as a result of the sharp attacks on the organization during the last Presiden-
tial Campaign, the A.C.L.U. has more resources than ever before. The organization's na-
tional membership has grown to more than 275,000, with an annual budget of $25 million, 
both all-time highs." N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, p. 19, col. 2. 
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servative, the Senate would have whisked it through before anyone 
had time to notify The People. 
Finally, to indulge fancy a bit, suppose Mr. Reagan had had 
the cunning to nominate a stalking-horse. Phyllis Schlafiy would 
have been ideal-a highly intelligent, conservative, woman lawyer 
with a zest for hand-to-hand combat utterly absent in Bork. In that 
event, Senator Edward Kennedy's vicious opening salvo against 
Bork to would have been met with an equally deadly broadside. 
To put it differently, Mrs. Schlafiy would instantly have recog-
nized the red pennant of "No Quarter" flying over the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee and would have responded accordingly. The 
Senate can't cope with contumacious defiance (for instance, Oliver 
North's performance) and by the time Schlafiy was voted down, and 
Senators had limped off to get their wounds stitched, Bork's subse-
quent nomination would have passed by unanimous consent at 2:00 
a.m. 
As Bronner's Battle for Justice-a slightly insipid, but essen-
tially fair journalistic narrative-amply documents, it was clear to 
anyone who ever ran for precinct captain that Robert Bork was a 
political innocent, whose performance under questioning had the 
shocked incredulity of a nun who has accidentally wandered into a 
bordello. Here was the same friendly committee that had waved 
him onto the prestigious D.C. Circuit Court (with no fireworks 
from the then Democratic minority) suddenly out for his scalp. 
Bronner puts the blame for this bushwacking squarely on the White 
House, where everyone from the president down anticipated an-
other easy trip on the Scalia model. 
Yet, as Heraclitus put it, character is destiny and the founda-
tion of Bork's political innocence had been laid long before his Sen-
ate ordeal. A disciple of the Chicago economist Aaron Director, 
Bork wholly rejected Holmes's dictum that the life of the law has 
not been logic, but experience. According to Bork, "Logic has a life 
of its own, and devotion to principle requires that we follow where 
logic leads."u His career, until it was sideswiped by the Senate, 
was a testimony to this vacuum-packed, esoteric doctrine. Sud-
denly this medieval scholastic, accustomed to a university environ-
ment where ideas have no practical consequences, found himself in 
a universe where it is generally agreed that a straight line is the 
shortest distance to disaster. What could a battle-scarred politician 
say of a man who, when asked why he would like to be on the 
Court, replied with patent sincerity, "I think it would be an intellec-
10. For the full indictment, see BRONNER, BAITLE FOR JUSTICE 98-99 (1990). 
11. /d. at 63. 
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tual feast, just to be there and to read the briefs and discuss things 
with counsel, and discuss things with my colleagues"? 
Having been worked over by Senate committees on several oc-
casions, and having watched at close range as my White House col-
leagues Joe Califano and Jim Gaither in 1968 desperately tried to 
get movement on President Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas as 
Chief Justice,12 I know the tribal custom on the Hill: when you 
smell blood, howl and join the pack. As LBJ predicted while the 
House of Representatives was debating punishment for Adam Clay-
ton Powell (the chamber's most powerful black}, that body would 
not stop short of expulsion: "they never kick a man when he's up, 
and they've been waiting for years to see him down. They just love 
to shoot the wounded." In short, the Senate's treatment of Bork 
was in character. 
In the fall of 1987 Ronald Reagan was a lame-duck who had 
lost his magic, the Democrats were back in control of the Senate, 
the high priests of the media were eagerly anticipating a confronta-
tion (they would never forgive Reagan for treating them like mem-
bers of some Rotary Club rather than as peers of the realm), and 
Bork provided a choice opportunity. Just as the ideal juror these 
days seems to be someone who never reads a paper or watches tele-
vision, the ideal candidate for a judgeship is one who never wrote a 
letter home, much less committed controversial opinions to print. 
Bork, however, had left a paper trail a mile long and the liberal 
pressure groups (with no realization they were fighting for the 
wrong island) did a spectacular job compiling "The Book of Bork." 
I knew that Bork would be given a work-out, but it never en-
tered my mind that he would be the victim of an intellectual lynch-
ing-bee. I, for example, would have enjoyed questioning him on the 
subtleties of whether and how to enforce the Original Intentions of 
the Framers. But the assault rapidly took on the characteristics 
epitomized in Senator Kennedy's July 1 invective; by the time the 
ad hoc "Block Bork Coalition" got into motion, the real questions 
before the Senate seemed to be whether Bork would 1) return blacks 
to slavery; 2) restore the antique common law notion of a woman as 
a chattel; 3) relegitimize "yellow dog" contracts; and 4) enforce 
Thomas Jefferson's view that castration is the appropriate penalty 
for rape, sodomy, and adultery. 
As the hearing dragged on through September something re-
sembling a religious revival swept the nation's law schools, resulting 
in anti-Bork petitions signed by a couple of thousand law professors 
12. Roche, Book Review, NAT'L REv. Dec. 9, 1988 at 54 (reviewing A. MURPHY, FOR· 
T AS, THE CHECK COLLECTOR (1988). 
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and deans, most of whom probably had never read a Bork article or 
judicial opinion. A former student of mine, now a law professor, 
called and asked me to sign on. When I inquired about the details 
of the true bill, he said, to summarize, that Bork would take us back 
to Lochner. When I told him that Bork had cited Lochner as a 
horrible example of judicial usurpation, he replied that he hadn't 
followed the Original Intention debate but that everybody at his 
school thought Bork was an arrogant reactionary. I said I thought 
that if Bork was anything he was a radical in the libertarian tradi-
tion who wanted to incorporate his views in the law and provide 
spectral evidence that this was Original Intent. He asked, "What is 
spectral evidence?" I told him to read Cotton Mather's treatise on 
why it was inadmissible in witchcraft trials. He returned to teach-
ing trusts. He is a bright man, but I fear this was the modus oper-
andi used to collect all those Esquires. Of course, that's the way it 
is with political petitions. 
Outside the legal profession the Block Bork Coalition did a 
superb job of defamation. Norman Lear, the deus ex machina of 
People for the American Way, went through the entertainment in-
dustry and rounded up the usual suspects, but his tour de force was 
"The Last Word," a television spot featuring Gregory Peck ("Ahab 
in a grey flannel suit," as Perry Miller called him), on a "voice-
over" outside the Supreme Court temple stating with prophetic in-
tonation that Bork as a Justice would do a Samson on those pillars 
of American constitutional decency. As a retired political activist 
who vetted a lot of proposed political spots in his time, I had to give 
this four stars: it was a bam-burner and at $170,000 a real bargain. 
The content was a pungent rerun of the by then standard litany of 
vulgar misrepresentations. 
Bork took a hard fall and I confess my heart went out to him. 
I have never abandoned my conviction that judicial review is a Pla-
tonic aberration, though I believe that the framers took it, en princi-
ple, for granted, while reserving the right to denounce decisions that 
they disliked as "usurpations"-just like you and me. My impres-
sion of Bork was of a delightful, ironic, intellectual buccaneer. He 
loved to run up various controversial flags and see who saluted-a 
dangerous hobby, particularly when combined with irony, which in 
this life will get you into more difficulty than homicide. 
My problem with Bork was not that he seemed an ideologue 
with views set in concrete, but rather that I found his jurisprudence 
unclear. Predicting his behavior as a Supreme Court Justice struck 
me as a high risk endeavor; I kept thinking of Felix Frankfurter, 
another one-time intellectual pirate. So, faute de mieux, I sup-
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ported his nomination. I could never join the pentecostal vigilantes 
who were out to savage him, and given Ronald Reagan's prefer-
ences Bork was clearly the best candidate. I would have preferred 
an Edward Levi, but there were no Edward Levis in the competi-
tion. So "The People Rose"-and gave us Anthony Kennedy. As 
Robert Southey put it in The Battle of Blenheim, "But what good of 
it came at last?" Quoth little Peterkin, "Why I cannot tell, said he, 
But 'twas a famous victory." 
Turning from "The Book of Bork" to Bork's book, The Tempt-
ing of America, is not a pleasant task: the work is turgid, repeti-
tious, and bitter. One can understand the bitterness, but 
nonetheless-as my wise wife convinced me a quarter of a century 
ago-it sours the soul. Get catharsis from writing a blast, then put 
it aside for six months, reread it, and tear it up. One of the more 
appealing aspects of Bark's personality has been his irony, his abil-
ity to look at himself in the mirror and chuckle. At times, he still 
has it: I recently saw an interview with him in a student newspaper 
in which the questioner asked him how he thought he would appear 
in the light of history; he replied, "Unfortunately I won't be there to 
find out." However, this book lacks any trace of irony; it has the 
manic, teeth-gritted stridency of a Trotskyite polemic. The title of 
Chapter 12 provides a good example: "The Impossibility of All 
Theories that Depart from Original Understanding." 
It is hardly a state secret that I consider the quest for Original 
Intent an intellectual snipe-hunt.'J If in 1789 the First Congress, 
which teemed with framers, could get into a dispute over the presi-
dent's removal power, may God have mercy on judges and scholars 
who in 1990 set forth to read the minds of the distinguished de-
ceased. Charles Warren laid out the basic material in 1922 and 
while subsequent research has amplified his data-base, I think all of 
us who work in constitutional history are his academic heirs. 
Bork is far too intelligent to argue that the framers, and the 
1700-plus ratifiers who get thrown in every so often, had a blueprint 
for running the United States in our time. He further concedes that 
judicial usurpations of the legislative function go back at least to 
Calder v. Bull (1798) and suggests that judicial review of Acts of 
Congress was not meant to be within the scope of judicial power. 
However, he never supports unlimited majority rule on the British 
model: judges, assuming they do not arrogate to themselves the role 
of policy-makers, have the obligation to set the majority on the 
straight and narrow path of Original Intent. 
13. See Roche, Book Review, 5 CoNST. CoMM. 477 (1988) (for a crisp summation). 
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When you see a judge attempting to decide whether the Found-
ing Fathers, or the authors of the fourteenth amendment, would 
have approved mandatory busing to eliminate school segregation, 
how do you know what is going on in his mind? Is he waiting for 
James Madison or John Bingham to come to him in a vision? Or is 
he substituting his own values for those of these past worthies? 
Bork attempts to deal with this in a statement that defies logical 
analysis: 
The Slaughter-House Cases pose the interesting question of the appropriate judicial 
response to a constitutional provision whose meaning is largely unknown, as was, 
and is, the privileges and immunities clause. [Whether Charles Fairman's view] is 
the case or not, that the ratifiers of the amendment presumably meant something is 
no reason for a judge, who does not have any idea what that something is, to make 
up and enforce a meaning that is something eJse.l4 
While readers are decoding that delphic pronouncement, I 
might add that Bork's constitutional history is very sloppy. Begin-
ning with his treatment of Hayburn 's Case (1792), 1s as if it were a 
Court decision, through his assumption that after Taney's decision 
"Scott was to remain a slave,"16-his text is littered with simple 
misstatements of fact. We all make mistakes, but when Bork de-
claims with Solonic finality that "regulation of commerce had to be 
done for commercial reasons and not as a means of effecting social 
or moral regulation,"l7 it is clear that he has not read the statutes 
(e.g., the 1803 law, 2 Stat. 205, which prohibited the importation of 
slaves into states whose laws forbade slavery, or the later bans on 
lottery tickets, contraceptives, or other "bad" things) or the perti-
nent legal literature. Is 
He also glides over Pierce v. Society of Sisters ( 1925) and Meyer 
v. Nebraska (1923), treating them as defenses of religious and edu-
cational freedom. This may have been their net impact- indeed, I 
have argued that Meyer should be paired with Gitlow as a bridge 
case in the incorporation of the first amendment in the four-
teenth19-but in each the ratio decidendi was that the Catholic or-
der and the German teacher had been deprived of property without 
14. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 39 (1990). 
15. Id. at 24. 
16. ld. at 30. 
17. Id. at 56. 
18. See Cushman, National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 3 MINN. L. REv. 289, 381, 452 (1919); Cushman, National Police Power Under the 
Taxing Clause of the Constitution, 4 MINN. L. REv. 247 (1920); Cushman, National Police 
Power Under the Postal Clause of the Constitution, 4 MINN. L. REv. 402 (1920); cf Roche, 
Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Commerce Power, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 680 (1963). 
19. ]. Roche, American Liberty, in AsPECTS OF LIBERTY (Konvitz & Rossiter eds. 
1958). 
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due process. Like Buchanan v. Warley (1917), which barred racial 
zoning on the ground that it deprived realtors of their en-
trepreneurial vocation, these cases have marginal status in the his-
tory of civil rights. 
One final observation along these lines: Bork has not done his 
homework on Marbury, or, for that matter, on that great constitu-
tional broken-field runner John Marshall. In general he approaches 
the work of the founders and the early Court on bended knee: he 
would have profited greatly from reading Suzanna Sherry's delight-
ful report in this journal on the family picnic known as Hylton v. 
U.S. (1796)--the first case in which the Court exercised jurisdiction 
to determine the constitutionality of an Act of Congress.2o 
Bork in other words knows the words but not the music and 
thus ends up like most legal logicians in a distinctly ahistorical posi-
tion; his whole approach to Original Intent has an eschatological 
flavor. Hence he misses the disconcerting but delightful atmosphere 
of improvisation that surrounded all three branches of the "gen-
eral" government in its early years. For example, Supreme Court 
behavior in those days was pretty casual; Marbury merits some kind 
of prize. Bork correctly notes that Madison did not appear, but he 
has never read the full script. When, in March, 1801, the clock 
struck midnight in the Adams administration, Levi Lincoln, Jeffer-
son's Attorney-General, was acting Secretary of State while 
Madison visited his sick father. Lincoln, according to a legend that 
is too good to be false, was in Secretary of State John Marshall's 
office looking at his watch as the Secretary/Chief Justice (he occu-
pied both posts for six weeks) busily sealed commissions, and closed 
shop as the hands hit midnight. Lincoln, now only Attorney-Gen-
eral, did appear in Marbury as a witness. Marshall, always inquisi-
tive, asked him what happened to the commissions; Lincoln 
promptly pleaded the fifth amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination! 
Conservatives like Bork usually treat Marshall with great 
respect, which is amusing when you consider what a loose construc-
tionist he was. Marshall displayed an impressive talent for improvi-
sation, inventing the political question doctrine, belatedly providing 
a constitutional rationale for Jefferson's acquisition of new territo-
20. Sherry, Perspectives: Law in the Grand Manner, 2 CoNST. CoMM. 9 (1984). I 
would object that calling Hylton v. U.S. "an obscure taxation case" is a bit casual on her part. 
At the same time that the states were challenging Court jurisdiction in the English creditor 
cases (e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)) and pushing the eleventh amendment to restore sov-
ereign immunity, it is hard to believe that Spencer Roane, Edmund Pendleton and the others 
alleging the unconstitutionality ofthe carriage tax would have thus affinned the Court's juris-
diction over Congress. They were not barefoot country lawyers. 
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ries, dreaming up the concept of article I "legislative courts," and 
reading an "original package rule" into the commerce clause. In 
Marbury, his result may well have been true to some sort of "origi-
nal intention" about judicial review, but much of his reasoning was 
as slipshod and debaterish as anything produced by the Warren 
Court. 
Although Bork attempts to distinguish his views from Herbert 
Wechsler's famous 1959 article "Towards Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law,"21 I find his position essentially similar, though 
not as tightly argued. At the risk of being found in (temporary) 
agreement with Ronald Dworkin, I would argue that "neutral prin-
ciples" is an oxymoron, the epistemological version of the Indian 
rope-trick in which the magician climbs up his premises and then 
hauls them up behind him. I share a number of Bork's caustic opin-
ions of touchy-feely jurisprudence: "emanations from penumbras" 
(or was it vice-versa?) is a bit much. Yet when all is said and done 
Bork's reification of Original Intent has no more evidential solidity 
than does that of, say W.W. Crosskey or EdwardS. Corwin-both 
of whom concluded in the 1930's that the principles of the New 
Deal had been formulated at the Philadelphia Convention.22 
Bork thus finds himself, like many American conservatives, 
trying to find a corpus of values to conserve. The historical 
problem is that from the outset "American exceptionalism," as Toc-
queville called it, has been noted for improvisation, experimenta-
tion, and an ingrained contempt for history and precedent. Like it 
or not, the nucleus of the American tradition since the seventeenth 
century has been a dedication to various substantive goals, and an 
almost total disinterest in procedural niceties.23 After all, 600,000 
young men, and uncounted civilians, Union and Confederate, had 
to die to clarify some aspects of Original Intent. 
This casual approach to the dilemma of ends and means has 
always distressed a number of us from different locations on the 
political spectrum, but it is, and has been since 1789 (or even the 
1600s) the only game in town. Bork and I from our respective per-
spectives have criticized the groundrules, but to create a useful past, 
to conjure up a mythic Treasury of Grace upon which one can draw 
checks, is both intellectually bogus and politically useless. Alas, we 
21. R. BoRK, supra note 14, at 143. 
22. If gossip has a place in a learned journal, it might be noted that a number of 
Corwin's contemporaries felt he was "running" for the Supreme Court-as the first non-
lawyer. 
23. As John C. Calhoun noted in 1817, the Constitution "was not intended as a thesis 
for the logician to exercise his ingenuity on. It ought to be construed with plain, good 
sense .... " M. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE 79 (1987). 
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are a people without a historical umbilical cord: as an intelligent 
student said to me last week, "Wasn't it remarkable bow President 
Roosevelt finally got us to take on Hitler." Just as every American 
generation thinks sex was invented when it hit puberty, every polit-
ical cohort strongly supports stare if it likes the decisis. American 
law has been politically "seduced" since the memory of man run-
neth not to the contrary. 
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE. Edited by 
Randy E. Barnett.t Fairfax, Va.: George Mason University 
Press. 1989. Pp. viii, 416. Cloth, $39.50. 
Larry Alexander2 
I 
The ninth amendment is like a mysterious, unopened box only 
(relatively) recently discovered among constitutional artifacts. It 
bas not yet been placed on public display because the constitutional 
curators are unsure in which section of the museum to place it. 
Some, the minimalists, believe that it is empty and should be re-
garded as a very minor exhibit in the federal powers wing. Then 
there are the maximalists, those who think the ninth amendment 
box is full and that it belongs in the individual rights wing of the 
museum. Some maximalists (the optimists) think the box is a trea-
sure trove of rights that we should open as soon as possible. Indeed, 
they urge that the box and its contents not be kept in the museum at 
all, but should be put into service to deal with contemporary 
problems. Other maximalists (the pessimists) fear the ninth amend-
ment is a Pandora's box that should in the public interest remain 
closed, despite the constitutional framers' desire that it be opened. 
They are quite content to treat the amendment as a museum piece 
and nothing more. 
Interest in the ninth amendment is perhaps at an all time high. 
Evidence of this is the publication of a major symposium on the 
amendment and the book that is the subject of this review. The 
symposium,J also edited by Professor Barnett, consists of contem-
porary analyses of the ninth amendment. The book, on the other 
band, is a collection of the major writings on the ninth amendment 
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